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CAz FORUM ON THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY
The Domain of the Replicators
Selection, Neutrality, and Cultural Evolution
by J. Stephen Lansing and Murray P. Cox
Do cultural phenomena undergo evolutionary change, in a Darwinian sense? If so, is evolutionary
game theory (EGT) the best way to study them? Opinion on these questions is sharply divided.
Proponents of EGT argue that it offers a unified theoretical framework for the social sciences, while
critics even deny that Darwinian models are appropriately applied to culture. To evaluate these claims,
we examine three facets of cultural evolution: (i) cultural traits that evolve by Darwinian selection,
(ii) cultural traits that affect biological fitness, and (iii) coevolution of culture and biology, where
selection in one affects evolutionary outcomes in the other. For each of these cases, the relevance of
EGT depends on whether its assumptions are met. Those assumptions are quite restrictive: selection
is constant, time horizons are deep, the external environment is not part of the game, and neutral
processes such as drift are irrelevant. If these conditions are not met, other evolutionary models
such as neutrality, coalescence theory, or niche construction may prove more appropriate. We con-
clude that Darwinian processes can occur in all three types of cultural or biological change. However,
exclusive reliance on EGT can obscure the respective roles of selective and neutral processes.
In a series of three lectures given in honor of Stanisław Ulam
at the Santa Fe Institute in the fall of 2003, Harvard biologist
Richard Lewontin offered cogent reasons why the application
of Darwinian evolutionary models to culture is a dead end.
There is no question, he argued, that culture exists in humans;
one can argue whether it is possessed by higher apes, but it
is certainly not present in jellyfish. But models of cultural
change inspired by Darwinian processes begin with a false
premise because this population model of variation, inheri-
tance, and differential rates of reproduction was specifically
designed to explain a particular set of natural phenomena
that have a well-known empirical and mechanistic base. Cul-
tural evolutionists have no set of phenomena of comparable
concreteness; they cannot even reach agreement on how to
define and describe their objects of interest.
Yet interest in cultural evolution is increasing. As Kevin
J. Stephen Lansing is a Professor in the Department of Anthropology
at the University of Arizona (Tucson, Arizona 85721-0030, U.S.A.
[lansing@santafe.edu]), external professor at the Santa Fe Institute
(Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501, U.S.A.), and Senior Fellow at the
Stockholm Resilience Centre (Stockholm University, SE-10691
Stockholm, Sweden). Murray P. Cox is a computational biologist at
the Institute of Molecular BioSciences at Massey University (Private
Bag 11 222, Palmerston North 4442, New Zealand). This paper was
submitted 16 VI 08 and accepted 5 XI 09.
Laland pointed out at a conference at Durham University in
2007, a quick check of Web of Science shows that publications
and keywords associated with cultural evolution are in a pe-
riod of rapid growth. In 2003, the year Lewontin gave his
skeptical lectures in Santa Fe, Harvard launched a new pro-
gram in evolutionary dynamics. The program’s director, Mar-
tin Nowak, described evolutionary game theory as poised to
unite the study of adaptive agents of all kinds, from genes
and viruses, to cultures and languages:
The applications of evolutionary game theory pervade by
now all areas of biology. Interactions among genes, viruses,
cells, and humans are often instances of evolutionary games
that are amenable to empirical and theoretical investigation.
Game theory is the appropriate tool whenever the success
of an individual depends on others. (Nowak and Sigmund
2004:798)
Among contemporary cultural evolutionists, this view has
rapidly gained adherents. Evolutionary game theory is seen
as offering a powerful new foundation for studies of cultural
and behavioral evolution, one that promises to bond the social
sciences together under a unified theoretical framework (Gin-
tis 2006; Mesoudi, Whiten, and Laland 2006).
The mathematical foundation of evolutionary game theory
is the “the replicator equation” (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988:
147; Nowak 2006:3, 56). This equation is an optimization
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method that captures the essence of the Darwinian process
of selection, given certain simplifying assumptions. It has been
very successfully used to characterize frequency-dependent
selection and thereby gain insights into the evolution of be-
havior. But like all mathematical formalizations, the method’s
utility ultimately depends on the nature of the question. In
contemporary biology, the replicator equation is just one of
many tools used to investigate evolutionary processes. This
was not always the case: as late as the 1960s, the prevalent
view held that almost all mutations are under selection, but
subsequent discoveries in molecular biology led to a re-
appraisal of the role of selection in evolutionary change. To-
day, geneticists do not assume that most genetic changes are
caused by selection—an underlying premise in evolutionary
game theory. Instead, selection is inferred only when a null
model of neutrality can be rejected (Gould 1989). A similar
debate around the role of selection is now taking place in
theoretical ecology (Alonso, Etienne, and McKane 2006; Hub-
bell 2001), and recently a few anthropologists have also begun
to develop techniques to distinguish selection from neutral
processes in cultural phenomena (Bentley, Hahn, and Shen-
nan 2004; Lansing et al. 2008; Neiman 1995; Shennan and
Wilkinson 2001; the question was posed earlier by Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman 1973, 1981).
In the first section of this paper, we review the history of
cultural evolution in light of Lewontin’s challenge. Are there
cultural phenomena that undergo evolutionary change, in a
Darwinian sense? If so, is it appropriate to assume that these
systems are undergoing selection and are thus suited to mod-
eling as evolutionary games?1 Alternately, do neutral processes
also play a role? We pursue these questions across a range of
examples, from the naming of American children to male
dominance in Indonesian villages. Next, we consider the sig-
nificance of the environment for cultural evolution. The ex-
ternal biophysical environment has no role in evolutionary
games, but other kinds of evolutionary models can be used
to incorporate interaction between behavior and environ-
ment. Given these alternative approaches, we suggest that the
usefulness of replicator models depends on the answers to
three questions: Does the system under investigation fit a
Darwinian model of heritable variation? Is there evidence that
evolutionary selection has occurred? Is this selection process
uncoupled from the external environment?
When the answer to all three questions is affirmative, then
the replicator models of evolutionary game theory may offer
1. Selection operates whenever individuals reproduce at different rates.
It can, of course, take many forms: directional, balancing, or frequency
dependent. Frequency-dependent selection is a common focus of many
evolutionary games, that is, wherever changes in the frequency of one
group of players affect the frequency of the others. Nevertheless, in evo-
lutionary games, the environment consists solely of these other agents.
A key point we address here is the inability of game theory to model
different forms of environmental feedback; the environment, we claim,
is often more than just the sum of the other players in the game.
insights into cultural evolution. But how often are these con-
ditions met?
Selection and the Neutral Theory
In biology, the assumption that phenotypic variation is en-
tirely the result of selection began to be questioned in the
1960s as molecular biology started to obtain empirical data
that could be compared to the mathematical predictions of
population genetics. In 1968, geneticist Motoo Kimura pre-
dicted that the vast majority of evolutionary changes at the
molecular level are caused not by selection but by random
drift of selectively neutral mutants. Even in the absence of
selection, Kimura reasoned, evolutionary change will occur
as a result of chance, and this could be analyzed with tools
from probability theory. The idea that selection might have
little, or no, role in shaping portions of the genome was not
altogether new: Sewall Wright emphasized the importance of
neutral processes such as drift as early as the 1930s (Provine
1989). But Kimura took this idea further, offering a proba-
bilistic method for the detection of selective effects that could
be readily tested with data from the genome.
In genetics, the neutral theory was hotly debated for de-
cades. As Kimura observed in his 1968 paper, the prevalent
view in the 1960s held that almost all mutations are under
selection, and this opinion was slow to change. But as Stephen
J. Gould wrote in 1989, “These equations give us for the first
time a baseline criterion for assessing any kind of genetic
change. If neutralism holds, then actual outcomes will fit the
equations. If selection predominates, then results will depart
from [neutral] predictions” (Gould 1989:16). Kimura’s work
eventually led to a dramatic reversal in the way selection is
viewed in molecular biology: geneticists now infer selection
only when it can be shown that the assumption of neutrality
has been violated. The success of the neutral theory triggered
a shift in perspective, from the fitness of individual units of
selection, to the population-level consequences of both drift
and selection.
But is the neutral theory relevant above the molecular level?
Theoretical ecologists began to consider this question in the
1990s. Previously, the prevalence of species in ecological com-
munities was approached from a pan-selectionist perspective:
what are the special attributes of each species that explain its
abundance in a given environment? The neutral theory offered
an alternative hypothesis. If one assumes that species do not
differ in their competitive abilities, what would their preva-
lence be if it depended only on the total size of the ecological
community and the chance arrival of new species? In other
words, what role do neutral processes play in the formation
and persistence of ecological communities? This question is
now perhaps the most hotly debated topic in theoretical ecol-
ogy (Alonso, Etienne, and McKane 2006; Harte 2003). Math-
ematically, the neutral theory in ecology is faithful to its or-
igins in genetics; both rely on the same underlying
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.67 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 07:07:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Lansing and Cox Selection, Neutrality, and Cultural Evolution 107
mathematical model. Although the scope of the neutral theory
in ecology is still being tested, a shift is clearly under way
from the assumption of pan-selectionism to the view that
selection can only be inferred by showing departure from a
null model of neutrality (Hey 1999; Hu, He, and Hubbell
2006; Leigh 2007).2 As in genetics, this represents a change
in the level of analysis, from the fitness of individuals to the
effects of selection at the community level.3 As Kimura wrote
in 1983, “It is easy to invent a selectionist explanation for
almost any specific observation; proving it is another story.
Such facile explanatory excesses can be avoided by being more
quantitative” (Kimura 1983:xiv).
Cultural Evolution
So when, if ever, is cultural change an evolutionary process?
And can neutral tests even be applied to them? Broadly speak-
ing, these ideas are not new (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1973,
1981), but they are not exactly coffee table subjects within
anthropology today. To frame our discussion, we begin by
asking what is meant by cultural evolution in a Darwinian
context. We consider three quite different versions of this idea
in contemporary anthropology:
Type 1: purely cultural evolution. Culture is a domain apart
from biology, but it evolves in the same way. For this to be
true, cultural phenomena must comprise populations of el-
ements that have differential reproductive success based on
attributes that are both heritable and subject to selection.
Richard Dawkins’s “memes” are examples; so too are the
(mathematical) strategies that evolve in evolutionary games.
(For a critical review, see Ehrlich and Feldman 2003.)
Type 2: culture as it affects biological evolution. In this
interpretation, cultural evolution is the heritable nongenetic
transmission of any trait that affects the reproductive success
of individuals (Heyer, Sibert, and Austerlitz 2005). The in-
creased prevalence of deleterious genetic disorders in the Ash-
kenazi is an example of this evolutionary process.
Type 3: gene-culture coevolution. Darwinian processes oc-
cur in both culture and biology. They can interact, producing
a coevolutionary dynamic (Durham 1991; McElreath and
Henrich 2007), such as the coupled evolution of cattle farming
and adult lactose tolerance.
2. As Leigh observes (2007:2076), “no population geneticist, not even
Kimura, sought to deny the importance of adaptive evolution. Instead,
all major workers were interested, at least to some degree, in how neutral
processes affected adaptive evolution.” In ecology, as Leigh further notes
(p. 2087), everyone, even the advocates of the neutral theory, recognizes
that neutral theory is wrong when taken to extremes: adaptive processes
clearly do matter. In genetics, the question of precisely which regions of
the genome are under selection is being revisited using neutral theory
(see Hey 1999). What is common to both genetics and ecology (and, we
might add, to anthropology) is the option of using neutrality as a null
theory.
3. In genetics, the neutral theory refers to populations of individuals,
while in ecology, it refers to the species composition of ecological com-
munities (i.e., species are the “individuals”).
We begin with type 1 cultural evolution and ask whether
it is possible to apply a version of the neutral theory to cultural
phenomena and thus distinguish between the effects of se-
lection and drift. Hahn and Bentley (2003) investigated this
question when they examined the changing frequencies of
baby names in the United States. One can easily imagine a
selectionist explanation for the prevalence of names within a
society; for example, in each generation parents might pref-
erentially choose the names of culturally dominant or pres-
tigious individuals for their children. The alternative, neutral
hypothesis would predict a distribution of names that appears
no different from that produced solely by chance.4 In 2002,
the Social Security Administration published the thousand
most common baby names in each decade of the twentieth
century, based on a sample of 5% of all social security cards
issued to Americans. Most parents chose a preexisting name
for their infant, but occasionally a new name was introduced.
Hahn and Bentley found that a very few names were extremely
popular, while others persisted at lower frequencies.
To discover whether the popularity of names is caused by
selection or neutral drift, the researchers created a simulation
based on Kimura’s neutral theory and compared their results
with the observed data. With the reader’s indulgence, the
processes that lead to neutral equilibrium can be explained
with the statistician’s favorite example, a bag of colored mar-
bles. To model the effects of drift, the experimenter reaches
into the bag and grabs two marbles. One is randomly tossed
aside, while the other is magically duplicated; the latter (now
identical) pair of marbles is put back into the bag. Starting
with a bag of 10 marbles, each with a different color, all the
marbles in the bag will have the same color after only a few
replacements. This process will take much longer with bags
of 100 or 1,000 marbles.
Thus, drift reduces the number of colors in the bag. Mim-
icking the effects of mutation can counteract this process:
from time to time a marble with a new color is added to the
bag as replacement for a discarded marble. Neutral equilib-
rium is reached when the introduction of new colored marbles
by mutation matches the rate at which existing colors are
4. This usage raises an important semantic point, the meaning of terms
such as “selection,” “random,” and “chance.” In an evolutionary sense,
these words have very specific meanings that may differ from common
usage—for instance, they are frequently used as descriptors of change at
the population level. Consider: at some point, individuals will usually
choose a life partner; a choice that is generally considered highly selective
and distinctly nonrandom. But mate choice may not differ from expec-
tations under a model of random choice when considered at larger scales,
such as the perspective of an entire population. Many of the Indonesian
communities discussed later do not reject neutrality, which implies that
they are also probably consistent with assumptions of random mating.
We suspect our Indonesian subjects would disagree with this assessment,
and we assure our own partners that we feel the same. Nevertheless, this
scenario illustrates one of our key points: social scientists may exaggerate
the consequences of choices made by individuals. Thus a pan-selectionist
population model that assumed (evolutionary) selection in mate choice
at the scale under study here would likely be wrong.
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removed by drift. In the case of baby names, Hahn and Bentley
found that the observed distribution is consistent with a neu-
tral model, not selection.5 While any number of selectionist
models could be proposed for the frequency distribution of
baby names, there is only one neutral frequency distribution
for any given data set and population model. This distribution
depends solely on the total population size and the rate at
which new names appear. If selection is present, it will cause
departures from the neutral distribution that are readily de-
tectable if the sample size is sufficiently large.6
We draw two conclusions from this example. First, baby
names are an example of a cultural phenomenon that changes
on a historical time scale, one that lends itself to a Darwinian
evolutionary approach (namely, a population model of var-
iation, inheritance, and differential rates of reproduction).
Second, the neutral test shows this particular population can-
not be distinguished from neutral expectation; that is, there
is no evidence for it being under selection. This result does
not imply that selection plays no role in the choice of baby
names, but individual choices by parents do not produce a
broader change in the population of names. This point again
highlights a relevant ambiguity in the meaning of the word
“selection”: parents certainly select names, but this may or
may not lead to selection in a Darwinian sense.
To clarify the implications of this example, imagine that a
researcher interested in baby names decided to skip the neu-
tral test, and instead model the selection of names by creating
an evolutionary game. This could take the form of a com-
petition to pick the “best names” in each generation—perhaps
names that are not too common in the population or those
that carry a lot of prestige. Any number of games could be
constructed in this way, but because the system is actually
neutral, they would all be incorrect. This error would go
undetected unless researchers shift their attention away from
the selective advantages possessed by the “best” names to the
full frequency distribution of names.
5. Strictly speaking, it is more accurate to say that the data do not
reject neutrality. Under rare circumstances, distributions that are actually
under selection might appear neutral—most commonly, where selection
is only acting only very weakly. Furthermore, as with any statistical test,
Type II (or b) errors will also occasionally be observed; that is, we might
not reject the null hypothesis when it is actually false. Type II errors are
closely related to the sensitivity of the test being used—something that
should always be inferred.
6. Note that this does not preclude the possibility that selection has
produced evolutionary change at other scales. Thus, a recent study by
two sociologists (Lieberson and Bell 1992) found statistically significant
differences in the choice of names among certain subpopulations, thereby
suggesting that cultural notions about the naming of children may vary
among smaller population groups. However, these subpopulations would
need to be defined and some version of neutral testing applied to each
of them to discover whether this variation in naming actually leads to
departure from neutral expectation at the subpopulation level. In this
particular instance, such a test was not done. Our point is that it is
necessary to run some test for neutrality before devising a role for se-
lection rather than a priori assuming that selection must be acting.
Type 2: Culture as It Affects
Biological Evolution
Consider now type 2 cultural evolution, in which culture has
some effect on biological fitness. Many studies in evolutionary
social science fall into this category. For example, Winter-
halder and Smith (1992:23) state that in evolutionary ecology,
“analyses typically take the form of the following question:
in what environmental circumstances are the costs and ben-
efits of behavior X such that selection would favor its evo-
lution?” Indeed, most research in human behavioral ecology
is explicitly pan-selectionist, asking, “what are the fitness ef-
fects of different strategies in particular environments?”
(Clarke and Low 2001:637) rather than “are the behaviors we
observe actually under selection?”
In type 2 cultural evolution, culture can produce evolu-
tionary change by giving some individuals a selective advan-
tage. Two genetic methods have recently been developed to
assess whether this actually occurs in human populations.
Surprisingly, perhaps, neither method is based on a hunt for
genes. Instead, both use noncoding regions of the genome as
markers to assess changes in population genetic diversity. As
we will see, such changes can be caused by either cultural or
biological evolution.
One measure of Darwinian fitness is reproductive success:
selective advantage may translate into more descendants. Ge-
netic markers can be used to discover whether this has oc-
curred in real populations by examining the distribution of
genetic diversity. For example, we inherit our mitochondrial
DNA only from our mothers (it is not subject to sexual re-
combination). Some noncoding parts of this molecule un-
dergo rapid mutation; these are called hypervariable regions
and can be used as markers to estimate the relatedness of
individuals. Comparing any two people, the less variation in
their hypervariable regions, the more closely they are related.
At one extreme, individuals who share a very recent common
female ancestor will carry the same mitochondrial haplotype
(i.e., set of neutral mitochondrial DNA markers). An anal-
ogous approach can be used to identify haplotypes based on
shared patrilineal descent, using noncoding regions on the
nonrecombining portion of the paternally inherited Y chro-
mosome (NRY).
Figure 1 shows how these genetic markers can help to
evaluate the role of selection at the population level. If selec-
tion is not present (i.e., the system is neutral), every individual
has an equal chance of producing offspring (fig. 1a). But if
someone obtains a reproductive advantage, his or her de-
scendants will become disproportionately abundant in the
population (fig. 1b). There is also a third possibility: some
individuals in each generation might attain higher fitness (i.e.,
have more children) but not pass this characteristic on to
their own children. This produces a “Red Queen” dynamic,
in which male dominance exists but seldom persists within
families (fig. 1c). The Red Queen forestalls evolutionary
change by preventing any descent group from gaining a lasting
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Figure 1. Noncoding genetic markers can be used to track lines of de-
scent; here, each shade represents a single haplotype. Populations are at
neutral equilibrium (a); undergoing selection (b); and experiencing Red
Queen dynamics (c), in which dominance fluctuates and high fecundity
is not inherited. A color version of this figure is available in the online
edition of Current Anthropology.
advantage. As she explained to Alice, sometimes “it takes all
the running you can do to keep in the same place.”7
All three processes—neutrality, selection with high heri-
tability, and selection with Red Queen dynamics—generate
distinctive patterns in the relative frequencies of haplotypes
within populations. The first method developed to interpret
these patterns was based on coalescent trees (Austerlitz, Ka-
laydjieva, and Heyer 2003). These resemble the lineage dia-
grams long used by cultural anthropologists; both trace ge-
nealogies (“lines of descent”). Using haplotype data, a tree is
constructed extending backward in time to the most recent
common ancestor of a population sample. Because the hap-
lotype mutation rate can be estimated, the time back to the
most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) can also be inferred.
7. Originally proposed by Leigh van Valen (1973) and commonly con-
ceptualized in the context of host-parasite arms races, the Red Queen
hypothesis states that continuing adaptation is needed just to maintain
fitness relative to coevolving systems. That is, in the context of an an-
tagonistic coevolutionary arms race, evolution is occurring even though
mean fitness remains nearly stationary. At its most simple, a Red Queen
dynamic is simply the interaction between two (or more) competing
evolutionary units. Here, we merely extend this definition to include
different “families” (i.e., independent paternal lineages). The real signif-
icance of the Red Queen model is that it defines a particular form of
evolutionary change that is measurably distinguishable from related mod-
els, such as simple directional selection or neutral drift. The nonheritable
variation in male reproductive success described here results in reduced
effective population size compared to neutral equilibrium but not as
much as would occur as a result of simple dominance.
Both selective and demographic processes affect the branching
patterns of these genealogies. Tree imbalance occurs if some
branches become more or less bushy than predicted by a
neutral demographic history. There are various statistical mea-
sures for computing imbalance for the whole tree, as well as
measures for individual nodes. Generally speaking, tree im-
balance shortens the TMRCA; or equivalently, it reduces the
effective size of a population and, therefore, the amount of
variation observed in the population. Using this method,
Heyer and her collaborators discovered several cases of type
2 cultural evolution, in which culture has an effect on fertility,
and hence, the overall direction of biological evolution (Heyer,
Sibert, and Austerlitz 2005; fig. 2).
An interesting example comes from the Valserine Valley in
France. Heyer (1993) showed that this population could be
envisaged as two groups of families: first, stable families with
a long history in the area who had relatively high reproductive
success, and second, immigrants who had much lower (long-
term) reproductive success. Although, in a superficial sense,
historical immigration into the region was high, the “effective”
immigration rate was actually relatively low due to the reduced
reproductive success of immigrants.8 Over time, the core
8. “Effective” values are a necessary, if confusing, construct from evo-
lutionary biology. Consider “effective” population size as opposed to
“census” population size: not every individual alive today will contribute
to future generations. Dying before you have children is evolutionarily
equivalent to having not existed at all. Consequently, evolutionary ques-
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Figure 2. Example of coalescent trees. Typical genealogies are represented
for a neutral population (a), strong selection just before the completion
of a selective sweep (b), and cultural transmission of fitness (c). T5 rep-
resents the length of time that the studied sample contains five genetic
lineages; Tn therefore represents the time for n lineages. Adapted from
Heyer, Sibert, and Austerlitz (2005).
group of stable individuals—the region’s “old families”—con-
tributed more to future generations than the immigrants.
From a biological perspective, this effect is nothing more than
inbreeding among the old guard. Indeed, the social structure,
transmitted from one generation to the next, has caused at
least one genetic disorder to be maintained at increased fre-
quency despite the superficially high level of gene inflow from
surrounding populations. Nor is this example particularly un-
usual among human groups: exactly the same effect has been
found elsewhere (Austerlitz and Heyer 1998). Such cultural
pressure on biological evolution typically reduces the “effec-
tive” size of a population, and it is worth emphasizing that
this will seldom be advantageous. As this example shows, type
2 cultural evolution, sometimes described as the cultural
transmission of fitness, can counteract the effects of beneficial
natural selection and will typically increase the frequency of
disadvantageous alleles (e.g., disease genes or albinism).
The method of coalescent tree imbalance provides a
tions are usually more concerned with the number of individuals who
contribute to future generations (i.e., the “effective” population size)
rather than simply considering the number of individuals living in a
population at any given moment.
straightforward way to discover departures from neutrality.9
As shown by Blum et al. (2006), 5 or 10 generations of cultural
fertility transmission is enough to create an imbalance in the
tree topology, and this effect can still be detected after ∼20
generations (∼50 in the strongest cases). We have recently
developed another approach, which borrows from adapta-
tions of the neutral theory by ecologists to explain the abun-
dance of species in ecological communities. This method al-
lows us to ask the same questions about the frequencies of
haplotypes in human communities that Hahn and Bentley
asked about baby names: are they consistent with selection
or neutrality? The effects of selection are easy to detect: if a
dominant lineage has high reproductive success, its haplotype
will become more abundant at a rate proportional to its se-
lective advantage. Thus, researchers have discovered that a Y
chromosome haplotype, speculatively attributed to Genghis
Khan, is very common in central Asia (Zerjal et al. 2003).
9. Note that we are not advocating for any particular test of neutrality.
Hahn and Bentley used a variant based on power curves; Heyer and
colleagues used a method based on imbalance in coalescent trees; our
own research has largely employed a test based on Ewen’s sampling
formula. We emphasize the need to test for neutrality before modeling
selection, but we fully expect that different tests will have different power
in different circumstances.
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Figure 3. Estimates of effective male population size (Ne) for sampled
communities together with known census sizes. Data are sorted by census
size, and six sites for which census data were not available have been
excluded. Dashes above squares indicate Ne estimates that are larger than
census sizes; dashes below squares indicate a reduction in Ne. Gray circles
indicate sites that tested as nonneutral. Of these five sites, four sites
showed a reduction in Ne and one site lacked census data. The data point
for South Batur indicating an effective male population size of ∼2,000
is correct.
Human behavioral ecologists have long argued that we should
expect to see evidence for selection in human communities
due to the correlation between social dominance and fecun-
dity: “In more than one hundred well studied societies, clear
reproductive rewards for men are associated with status: high-
ranking men have the right to more wives” (Clarke and Low
2001:637). However, evidence for this claim derives from de-
mographic statistics collected over very short timescales (a
few generations at most). Even if dominance is correlated
with fertility over short timescales, a Red Queen effect could
nullify any long-term evolutionary consequences. In that case,
while some individuals might produce significantly more off-
spring than others, this tendency would not persist among
their descendants.
Male Dominance and the Red Queen
If male dominance often translates into more descendants,
this will be apparent from the distribution of NRY haplotypes
in communities, as well as from their effective population
sizes. We carried out this analysis for 41 Indonesian villages.
These communities included neolocal Borneo hunter-gath-
erers and central Javanese rice farmers, matrilocal horticul-
turalists on Flores, patrilocal Balinese wet-rice farmers, and
patrilocal horticultural clans on Sumba, Nias, and Flores. Es-
timated effective and census population sizes (which, we em-
phasize, are quite different measures) are shown in figure 3.
To our surprise, we found that 88% of these communities
(i.e., all but 5 of 41) are at neutral equilibrium with respect
to the distribution of NRY haplotypes (for full methods, see
Lansing et al. 2008). Figure 4 shows examples of both sim-
ulated and real haplotype frequency distributions. Neutral
distributions exhibit considerable variation; examples of sim-
ulated neutral distributions in samples of 35 men drawn from
populations of 100 and 300 are shown in figure 4a. To com-
pare with real data, two typical neutral villages are shown in
fig. 4b, and two nonneutral communities in fig. 4c. Three of
the five nonneutral villages are consistent with positive selec-
tion (i.e., potentially male dominance), while the other two
instead appear to be the result of recent demographic pro-
cesses (i.e., rather than haplotypes being too similar, they
actually appear to be too diverse).
The remaining 36 villages in the study were at neutral equi-
librium. This does not imply that social dominance or com-
petition between males does not occur in these communities,
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Figure 4. Nonrecombining Y chromosome (NRY) haplotype distribu-
tions. Frequencies are shown on the X-axis; number of carriers on the
Y-axis. a, Simulated neutral data sets; b, c, observed neutral and non-
neutral data sets, respectively. Grayscale shading in b and c identifies
different NRY haplogroups. For example, in b, top, three different hap-
lotypes—each from a different haplogroup—are represented by only a
single carrier, whereas one haplotype is carried by 10 individuals (i.e.,
40% of the population).
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Figure 5. Persistence of nonneutral genetic diversity at different effective
population sizes. Time in generations is shown on the X-axis; effective
population size on the Y-axis. Initial conditions are extreme cases: either
all unique haplotypes (upper curves) or all identical (lower curves). The
mutation rate m in these simulations is 0.0208, based on calculations for
the Indonesian samples described in the text; and the male generation
interval is 31 years (Fenner 2005). For an average-sized population
( ), nonneutral diversity can be observed for ∼20 generationsN ≈ 400e
(∼600 years) following a selective event. Therefore, we know that our
neutral Indonesian populations have not experienced a detectable selec-
tive event for centuries. A color version of this figure is available in the
online edition of Current Anthropology.
but it does mean that no heritable traits or behaviors that are
passed paternally, be they biological or cultural, were under
selection strong enough to have detectable evolutionary con-
sequences. Interestingly, such deviations from neutrality per-
sist for a long time. Figure 5 shows the return to neutrality
from two extreme situations: all haplotypes initially identical
(lower curves in each panel) and all haplotypes initially dif-
ferent (upper curves in each panel). For an average-sized pop-
ulation (say, effective size ), nonneutral diversity canN p 400e
be observed for ∼20 generations, or ∼600 years, following a
selective event (for a male generation interval of 30 years;
Fenner 2005). The finding that 88% of our Indonesian pop-
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ulations exhibit neutral diversity is therefore doubly interest-
ing. Not only are these populations neutral today, but they
have also been undisturbed by selective events for a consid-
erable period of time.
We draw two conclusions from these examples. First, in
response to Lewontin, we have shown that the Darwinian
model of heritable variation can yield insights into several
different types of cultural evolution. Second, we saw that it
is possible to test whether a given system is under selection,
by looking for the signature of selection at the population
level. No model of selection, including the replicators of evo-
lutionary game theory, will be of use in understanding systems
that are actually neutral. But if the system does show evidence
of selection, what then?
Type 3: Coevolutionary Models
Humans, like beavers and termites, are vigorous practitioners
of what biologists call “niche construction,” the active mod-
ification of their habitat, which can alter selection pressures
on behavior through feedback relationships (Laland and Feld-
man 2000:132). Well-known examples for humans include
the coevolution of animal domestication and adult tolerance
to lactose in milk and the coevolution of sickle-cell anemia
and malaria in response to increasingly settled communities
(Durham 1991; Joy et al. 2003). These are examples of type
3 cultural evolution, the coevolution of culture and biology.
Is a Darwinian approach well suited to model these kinds of
interaction? If so, are evolutionary games the best approach?
Because they address the coupling of behavior with the
environment, coevolutionary models often have lots of mov-
ing parts, which can easily obscure their inner workings.
Hence it is preferable to choose toy examples that are as
uncomplicated as possible. We begin with the simplest case,
the interaction of one species with a single environmental
parameter. The model is James Lovelock’s Daisyworld, in
which natural selection is directly linked to environmental
effects (Lenton and Lovelock 2000, 2001). We consider two
variants of this model: neutral and coevolving.
Case 1: Neutral Daisyworld
This imaginary planet is a world like our own, except that it
is mostly ocean.10 There is a chain of islands along the Equator,
on which only daisies grow. The average temperature of Dai-
syworld is 22.5C, and the daisies grow best at that temper-
ature. The daisies are identical except for their color. As time
progresses, different colored daisies appear by mutation, and
their numbers fluctuate due to random drift. The resulting
distribution of flowers on each island is in drift-mutation
equilibrium.
10. This neutral version of Lovelock’s Daisyworld model is our own
invention.
Case 2: Coevolving Daisyworld
Coevolving Daisyworld is identical to neutral Daisyworld ex-
cept for two changes: (1) the ocean is replaced by land, and
daisies can grow almost everywhere, and (2) the sun slowly
grows hotter over time, much like our own sun.
These changes trigger a coevolutionary feedback process.
Patches of dark flowers absorb more solar energy than light-
colored flowers, making their local habitat slightly warmer.
Consequently, when the sun is cool, the dark-colored daisies
enjoy a selective advantage over light-colored flowers because
the warmer temperature of the dark patches is slightly closer
to the optimum for daisy growth. Conversely, when the sun
grows hotter, the patches of light daisies are cooler. This dif-
ference in their microclimate gives them an advantage when
the sun is hot, whereupon they outcompete the darker flowers.
This local fitness differential creates a feedback relationship
at the global scale. It works like this: when the sun is cool,
the dark daisies spread across the planet’s surface, and as they
do so the warming effect also spreads. Eventually the entire
planet is warmed to approximately the ideal temperature for
the flowers, 22.5C. Later on, as the sun grows hotter, the
light daisies grow faster than black ones, replacing them and
cooling the planet. Daisyworld’s temperature is thus main-
tained near the optimum for the daisies, despite changes in
the sun’s radiance, as shown in figure 6.
Imagine that a team of astronauts arrives to study the flow-
ers on both planets. What would they conclude? If they focus
only on fitness differences between flowers, both systems will
appear to be neutral. All daisies grow best at 22.5C, and
under these conditions, all flowers have the same fitness re-
gardless of color. The only way to discover that coevolving
Daisyworld is not neutral would be to apply a test of neu-
trality. This population-level comparison would show that
color is under active selection on coevolving Daisyworld, but
not on neutral Daisyworld, where the diversity of colored
flowers is at neutral equilibrium.
A neutral test is enough to distinguish selection from neu-
trality, but importantly, it cannot explain why the two cases
differ. While coevolving Daisyworld is under selection, an
evolutionary game cannot explain the reason, because there
is no fitness differential for the replicator equation to model;
from the perspective of replicator dynamics, any environ-
mental effects are considered only by proxy through the fitness
of the daisies. This diverts our attention away from the real
phenomenon of interest, the role of the flowers in planetary
engineering. A full understanding of coevolution on Daisy-
world requires a coevolutionary model, such as niche con-
struction, which goes beyond variation in individual fitness
to analyze the effects of environmental coupling at the pop-
ulation level (Lansing, Kremer, and Smuts 1998).
How important is this distinction? Suppose that our as-
tronauts become interested in the economic potential of both
planets as interstellar flower suppliers. On neutral Daisyworld,
harvest techniques would not matter; while prolonged har-
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Figure 6. Simulated temperature regulation on Daisyworld. As the lu-
minosity of its aging sun increases from 0.75 to 1.5 times the average
value, the temperature of a bare planet would steadily rise (line 2). In
contrast, the temperature of Daisyworld stabilizes close to 22.5 C with
daisies present (line 1).
vesting might affect the daisies themselves, the environment
would not be perturbed. However, on coevolving Daisyworld,
there are two alternative possibilities. Selective flower harvests
would cause tiny, probably unnoticeable tremors in planetary
temperature. But clear-cutting large contiguous patches of
daisies could cause global temperature regulation to suddenly
fail.
Something very like this imaginary catastrophe occurred
on the rice terraces of Bali. Because this case has been dis-
cussed extensively elsewhere (Lansing 2006, 2007), here we
provide only a summary highlighting the parallel with the
imaginary failure of temperature regulation on Daisyworld.
In the 1970s, the Asian Development Bank became involved
in an effort to boost rice production in Indonesia. The bank’s
consultants learned that on Bali, local groups of farmers syn-
chronize their irrigation schedules. In most regions, these
schedules produced two rice harvests of native Balinese rice
per year. The consultants saw two ways to improve harvests.
The first was to encourage the farmers to grow higher-yielding
“Green Revolution” rice varieties, which produce more grain
than Balinese rice. The second recommendation took advan-
tage of another feature of the new rice: it grows faster than
native rice. Consequently, the farmers could plant more fre-
quently. The Ministry of Agriculture adopted both recom-
mendations, and competitions were created to reward the
farmers who produced the best harvests. By 1977, 70% of the
southern Balinese “rice bowl” was planted with Green Rev-
olution rice.
At first, rice harvests improved. But a year or two later,
Balinese agricultural and irrigation workers began to report
“chaos in water scheduling” and “explosions of pest popu-
lations.” At the time, planners dismissed these occurrences as
coincidence, and recommended higher doses of pesticides.
However, a model of niche construction offers an alternative
explanation for the harvest decline. On Daisyworld, the flow-
ers were coupled to a single environmental parameter—tem-
perature. A niche construction model of Balinese farming
requires two environmental parameters, water and pests—
both of which are affected by a single strategic choice: the
scheduling of irrigation. Traditionally, Balinese rice farmers
manage their fields collectively in organizations called subak.
Because irrigation depends on seasonal rainfall, each subak’s
choice of an irrigation schedule affects the availability of water
for their neighbors downstream (fig. 7). The timing of irri-
gation can also be used to control rice pests like rats, insects,
and insect-borne diseases. This is accomplished by synchro-
nizing rice harvests and then briefly flooding the fields, thus
depriving the pests of their habitat. The larger the area that
is encompassed by the postharvest flooding, the fewer the
pests. But if too many subaks try to flood their fields at the
same time, there will not be enough water to go around.
To test the ability of the subaks to discover effective so-
lutions to this trade-off between pest control and water short-
ages, we constructed a forward-in-time simulation model.
Through a process of trial and error, each subak seeks to
discover an irrigation schedule that minimizes losses both to
pests and water shortages. In less than a decade, a patchwork
of synchronized irrigation schedules comes into existence,
which closely resembles the schedules observed on the ground.
As this occurs, rice harvests improve because water shortages
and pest damage are reduced for the entire watershed. When
the key environmental parameters are stabilized, variation in
harvests declines because these benefits spread across the en-
tire system.
The key feature of both Daisyworld and the Balinese ex-
ample is that they appear to be neutral from the perspective
of evolutionary game theory, which focuses on variation in
fitness at the level of individuals. Yet in reality, both are ex-
amples of tightly coupled coevolving systems. These phenom-
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Figure 7. Subaks, rivers, and irrigation systems along the Oos and Petanu
rivers of southern Bali. Traditionally, each subak is free to choose its own
irrigation schedule. Crop losses due to pests or water shortages can be
avoided by synchronizing irrigation with different-sized clusters of neigh-
boring subaks. Map is not to scale, subaks are not rectangular, and many
more water temples exist than are depicted here. From Lansing (2007:
119).
ena cannot be modeled with evolutionary games, to which
they are effectively invisible.11
Perhaps, then, it is relevant to note that when pests and
water shortages destroyed harvests in Bali, consultants inter-
11. Lansing and Miller (2005) constructed a two-player evolutionary
game to model the trade-offs between water sharing and pest control.
Unlike in standard evolutionary games, in this model the strategic payoffs
depend on environmental parameters, which are affected by player’s de-
cisions about synchronized cropping. But this model does not permit
coevolutionary feedback to occur. For that it is necessary to embed the
simple two-player game within a larger, coevolutionary model (Lansing
2006).
preted these problems as chance misfortunes. They urged the
farmers to apply higher doses of pesticides while continuing
to compete to grow as much rice per year as possible. This
actually intensified both the pest problem (Machbub, Ludwig,
and Gunaratnam 1988; Lansing et al. 2001) and water short-
ages (Horst 1998). It was only when farmers spontaneously
returned to synchronized planting schemes that harvests be-
gan to recover—a point subsequently acknowledged by the
evaluation team from the Asian Development Bank (Lansing
2007:124–125):
Substitution of the “high technology and bureaucratic” so-
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lution in the event proved counter-productive, and was the
major factor behind the yield and cropped area declines
experienced between 1982 and 1985. . . . The cost of the
lack of appreciation of the merits of the traditional regime
has been high. Project experience highlights the fact that the
irrigated rice terraces of Bali form a complex artificial eco-
system, which has been recognized locally over centuries.
(Project Performance Audit Report, Bali Irrigation Project
in Indonesia; Asian Development Bank 1988)
Conclusion: Short Hops on the
Evolutionary Streetcar?
“The most important question,” Lewontin recently wrote, “is
why we should use a Darwinian model at all for history and
culture” (2005: 23). Here we have described cases in which
Darwinian models offer some insights into a range of cultural
phenomena. However, these examples should give pause to
the proponents of a pan-selectionist view of cultural evolu-
tion, the real target of Lewontin’s critique. In standard evo-
lutionary games, replicator dynamics drive an optimization
process fueled by fitness differences, and the most successful
phenotypes (i.e., strategies or players) become dominant. But
in the examples we have considered, this did not occur. In-
stead, drift overwhelmed selection, effective population sizes
decreased, the Red Queen suppressed fitness differences, and
niche construction improved harvests. Modeling any of our
systems as evolutionary games would fail to reveal these dy-
namics and thus divert attention from the models’ most in-
teresting features.
Consequently, we have emphasized the need to go beyond
models of individual selection, to assess the consequences of
selection at the population level. It may be that this point is
even more important for anthropology than it is for genetics
and ecology. Biologists have the luxury of thinking in terms
of deep time, while cultural phenomena are generally more
ephemeral. The concept of limitless time is vital to one of
the principal arguments in favor of evolutionary games in
biology, the “phenotypic gambit.” According to this argu-
ment, genetics can be ignored if the aim is to discover an
evolutionary strategy that is stable against genetic perturba-
tion and is a presumptive target for selection (Marrow, John-
stone, and Hurst 1996). Such models have an advantage over
those of traditional population genetics due to their relative
mathematical simplicity: by ignoring many of the details of
genetic inheritance, game theory has been able to provide
significant insight into a number of important biological
problems (e.g., the evolution of altruism and sex ratios). The
respective roles of evolutionary game theory and genetics in
biology have been likened to a streetcar, where the successive
invasion and replacement of mutants cause movement from
stop to stop. The details of short-term movement between
temporary stops of the evolutionary streetcar are the domain
of conventional population genetics theory (Hammerstein
2005; Marrow, Johnstone, and Hurst 1996). Evolutionary
game theory is thus free to investigate whether the ultimate
destination of the streetcar is an evolutionarily stable strategy.
Whether this approach makes sense for many cultural phe-
nomena is an open question. It seems more likely that in
most cases involving culture, time horizons will be short, the
streetcar may not reach its destination, and disruptive Red
Queen dynamics may be commonplace in competitive situ-
ations. But to find out, we need more empirical studies that
attend to both individual competition and its population-
level consequences. The potential significance of environ-
mental effects, often beyond the control or awareness of in-
dividual agents, is also underlined by the examples of niche
construction in Daisyworld and Bali. As these models show,
the consequences of coevolution at the global scale can be a
reduction in fitness differences and the false impression that
these systems are not evolving. We suspect that the fashion
for replicators and evolutionary games may have hindered
anthropologists from recognizing similar cases elsewhere.
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Is There a “Neutral Theory of
Anthropology”?
Lansing and Cox open a welcome discussion of the potential
for neutral models in anthropology—it has been almost 50
years since the original neutral models were applied to DNA
sequences (e.g., Kimura 1968) and then later to biological
phenotypes (e.g., Lande 1976) and cultural data (Cavalli-
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Sforza and Feldman 1981; Neiman 1995). This long history
of research is a gold mine for studies of culture evolution.
In engaging with it, we first need to be careful not to
conflate Kimura’s neutral theory with a generic neutral model.
While Kimura developed much of the population genetics of
neutral alleles, his neutral theory was a larger argument that
most molecular changes really are neutral: that too much
genetic variation exists within and between species for all of
it to be selected.
In contrast to the neutral theory, choosing a neutral model
(with a particular population history) as a null hypothesis
merely implies that nonsignificant tests are consistent with
neutrality. This can be quite specific; particular types of ele-
ments of the songs of chestnut-breasted warblers, for example,
are consistent with the neutral model, whereas other elements
are not (Byers, Belinsky, and Bentley 2010). What is more
challenging is to demonstrate more than mere consistency
with neutrality, as many selective models can give the same
patterns of nucleotide variation as neutral models. For ex-
ample, Gillespie (1977) showed that a straightforward model
of balancing selection gives exactly the Ewens-Watterson dis-
tribution of allele frequencies promulgated by Lansing and
Cox. In fact, for molecular evolution, recent genomic data no
longer support the neutral theory or even neutral models as
the null hypothesis (Hahn 2008).
What, then, justifies neutrality rather than selection as the
null model? Parsimony can be one justification (e.g., Gould
and Lewontin 1979), but a stronger justification would also
include evidence that the process, not just the pattern, is con-
sistent with the neutral model. In our study of baby names
(Hahn and Bentley 2003), we deliberately chose a process in-
volving discrete, tractable replicators (names), which are copied
exactly from one person to another, except for the relatively
rare (but persistent) invention of unique new names. We chose
a unique time and place—twentieth-century United States so-
ciety—in which first names could be copied relatively indis-
criminately (to an unprecedented degree, compared to tradi-
tional kinship systems). Had we then “zoomed in” to smaller
scales within the United States, we ought to have encountered
a scale where the neutral model is falsified by discernible com-
munities in which particular names are strongly selected (e.g.,
Fryer and Leavitt 2004; Smith and MacRaild 2009). Archae-
ologists have used this to identify prehistoric communities,
which come into focus at the scale where the neutral model is
most strongly falsified (Lipo 2001).
For large societies, neutral models often seem more ap-
propriate than approaches like repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
games (RPDG), which often feature one-on-one contests with
binary (e.g., cooperation vs. defection) options. In contrast,
the real world is replete with complex, multiperson “games”
involving multiple, possibly countless, different choices. Also,
unlike RPDG experiments with viruses (Turner and Chao
1999), humans are usually too capricious, spontaneous, and
imitative to adhere to the rules of the game (e.g., Traulsen et
al. 2010). Instead, humans like to copy each other—it saves
time and is usually a safe bet. In a recent RPDG computer
tournament, the winning strategy was one that regularly cop-
ied the successful strategies of others, with a bias towards
discounting older information (Rendell et al. 2010).
In the internet age, the massive, highly replicative nature of
modern online society means that the process of cultural trans-
mission may be more like a neutral model than ever before.
Copying others predominates in online behavior because copy-
ing hyperlinks is how the network is built, and exact copying
is inherent to “friending” someone on Facebook, posting a link
to news on a blog, or citing a paper that you have never read
(e.g., Simkin and Roychowdhury 2003). Living and working
online, people have perhaps never copied each other so pro-
fusely (since it usually costs nothing), so accurately, and so
indiscriminately. The lack of discrimination applies not only at
the aggregated population scale but even possibly (needs test-
ing) at the individual scale. There is tremendous potential for
testing both neutral and selection models of online behavior—
never before have so many measurable data of human behavior
been available, with new easily used tools such as Google Trends
(cf. Bentley and Ormerod 2010).
Lansing and Cox give us several examples where neutral
models fit cultural data quite well, but deciding whether a
true “neutral theory of anthropology” exists still needs testing
on many more data sets. Given the easy availability of online
data sets that would have constituted a major research project
just a decade ago, an avalanche of such analyses may already
be on its way.
Marcus W. Feldman
Department of Biology, 385 Serra Mall, Stanford University,
Stanford, California 94305-5020, U.S.A. (mfeldman@stanford
.edu). 18 VI 10
Three general issues are raised in the review by Lansing and
Cox (LC hereafter), as well as several particular points on
which quantitative evolutionists may disagree. Both the gen-
eral and particular issues have a much longer history than
they imply.
The general issues can be summarized as three questions
that I address sequentially. The first question follows from
Lewontin’s lectures at the Santa Fe Institute, “Is cultural evo-
lution theory ‘based on Darwinian processes’ useful at all in
light of Lewontin’s claim that there are no cultural phenom-
ena of ‘comparable concreteness’ to those studied in evolu-
tionary biology?” Lewontin’s claim, expanded greatly in Frac-
chia and Lewontin (1999), is that since there are no “units
of culture” comparable to genes, inheritance and differential
fitness of cultural units have no place in the study of culture
change. Fracchia and Lewontin have two main reasons for
this claim. The first is that culture is, by definition, a gestalt
that cannot be broken down into parts that can be studied
separately. The second is that for each culture, historical con-
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tingency is much more important than such processes as
transmission and/or selection.
I have addressed these (Feldman 2008) by an analogy with
progress in biological science before and after the rediscovery
of Mendel’s rules of genetic inheritance. Before, biology was
dominated by biometrics, and the whole biological phenotype
was the accepted center of research, even for evolutionary
studies. This led to errors in rules of correlation between
relatives and almost no progress in the architecture of phe-
notypes until Fisher (1918) developed a plausible model of
the relation between genotype and phenotype. The analogy
with anthropology is that most of the field lies stuck in the
quagmire of pre-Mendelian descriptive analysis, while the
quantitative analysis of societal change is actively discouraged.
This is not to say that historical contingency is unimpor-
tant. Indeed it may be more important than deterministic
processes for cultural evolution. But its importance can quan-
tified, as Sewall Wright did for biological evolution, in the
extent of randomness relative to directional forces. In prin-
ciple, Wright’s random genetic drift and shifting balance the-
ory can be incorporated into cultural evolutionary theory
(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981), and indeed, they may be
more important than the cultural differences in fertility and
mortality discussed by LC.
The second issue raised by LC can be posed as, “Is evo-
lutionary game theory the appropriate paradigm in which to
articulate and model cultural evolution?” LC seem to claim
that evolutionary game theory (EGT) and Darwinian models
are equivalent, even to the extent that a rejection of a neutral
model of cultural variation implies that this variation is a
validation of EGT. Despite the claims of Nowak and Sigmund
(2004) and Gintis (2006), EGT and Darwinian models are
not the same, as has been pointed out elsewhere (Feldman,
Otto, and Christiansen 1997; Spencer and Feldman 2005).
The difference between these is the difference between so-
called adaptive dynamics and population genetic models of
genotypic and phenotypic change. Adaptive dynamics (and
EGT) make strong approximations about rules of genetic
transmission (linkage is ignored, selection must be weak, and
multiple stable equilibria, including polymorphisms, do not
occur) and are based on the idea of evolutionary optimization.
That is, phenotypes, such as behaviors, change in such a way
that some function of the frequencies of these traits is opti-
mized. The population genetic approach makes no such as-
sumptions and, importantly, does not assume that local dy-
namics are sufficient to describe global dynamics. In the case
of cultural evolution, where some modes of transmission
among members of the population may be difficult to dis-
tinguish from a fitness advantage to the transmitted traits,
EGT has even less of a role to play. In this case there may be
conflicts between frequency change due to transmission and
frequency change due to Darwinian processes; hence the pos-
sibility that maladaptive variants of a cultural trait may spread
(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Lehmann and Feldman
2009). In fact the implication that evolutionary games and
replicator dynamics are the same, and that both “drive an
optimization process,” is incorrect.
The third question raised by LC is, “Is the selection neu-
trality debate relevant or approachable when the traits under
study are cultural?” Here, I do not agree with LC that “there
is only one neutral frequency distribution for any given data
set and population model.” The test of neutrality that has
been borrowed from population genetics for use in ecology
and archaeology is of the Ewens-Watterson form (Ewens
2004), and it assumes a particular form of mutation called
the “infinite alleles model.” Is this “the correct” neutral model
for testing frequency distributions of cultural variants? The
neutral distribution for babies’ names, tested by Hahn and
Bentley (2003), depends on this mutation model and it being
the same in all segments of the population. Further, cultural
and Darwinian selection may differ in their expected trait-
frequency spectra. Thus neutrality is not unique, and not as
simple as it seems.
Evelyne Heyer
De`partement Hommes, Natures, Socie´te´s, Unite´ Mixte de
Recherche 7206, Eco-anthropologie Equipe “ge´ne´tique des
populations humaines,” CP 139, 57 rue Cuvier, 75231 Paris
Cedex 05, France (heyer@mnhn.fr). 13 VII 10
In this paper, J. S. Lansing and Murray Cox broaden the
classical view on cultural evolution in a Darwinian context
too frequently restricted to an evolutionary game theory ap-
proach and consider three versions of this idea: purely cultural
evolution, culture as it affects biological evolution, and gene-
culture coevolution.
My first comment is on methodological difficulty for de-
tecting transmission of cultural behavior linked to fitness
(their version 2) with genetic data. I feel the authors do not
stress enough all the methodological difficulties. One way to
test for the existence of any transmission of cultural behavior
linked to fitness is to study the distribution of genetic alleles
in the population under study. When a such phenomenon
exists, the distribution of genetic diversity will show in most
of the cases a departure from neutrality. Indeed, in some cases
two phenomena can coexist whose signatures on the human
genome can counterbalance each other. For example, in the
Quebec population, the demographic growth of the popu-
lation changes the distribution of haplotypes in one direction,
and the fertility transmission puts it back in the reverse di-
rection, so that at the end the allele distribution is much closer
to a neutral Ewens distribution than are distributions in the
European source populations (Heyer, Austerlitz, and Labuda
2001; Moreau et al. 2009). Fortunately, other population ge-
netic tests show the nonneutral pattern. Therefore, as the
authors state it, neutrality should be tested first but not with
only one test.
Once you have shown that your process is “nonneutral,”
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the theoretical challenge is to decipher which evolutionary
forces are involved: it could be biological selection, population
growth, or cultural transmission of behavior. Classical pop-
ulation genetic studies have developed several tools to distin-
guish selection from population growth. But what remains
even more difficult from a theoretical point of view is to
distinguish between population growth and cultural trans-
mission of a trait that is linked to fertility. Like population
growth, cultural transmission of fertility has an impact on the
whole genome. Thus, for most of the population genetics
statistics, it will give the same results: effective size (Ne) is
reduced, and coalescent trees are star shaped (Sibert, Auster-
litz, and Heyer 2002). It was really a theoretical challenge to
be able to design a statistical test that can untangle population
growth from fertility transmission. Thanks to the help of sev-
eral mathematicians we have designed one that is based on
the imbalanced shape of coalescent tree (Blum et al. 2006).
Until now these tests have been used only on uniparental
markers, and a new challenge is to extend their application
to autosomal markers. Indeed, when fertility transmission is
detected on uniparental markers, we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that biological selection is the driving force. If the same
signal is detected on several independent markers (i.e., au-
tosomal) this strengthens the conclusion that fitness-linked
behaviors are culturally transmitted. Not until such tests are
designed will we be able to evaluate properly the importance
of the cultural transmission of behaviors linked to fitness in
different cultural and geographical areas.
My second comment is about an aspect of cultural trans-
mission that is not emphasized enough by the two authors,
the fact that cultural transmission is far from efficient. This
is a key issue for evolutionary game theory approach. In most
evolutionary game theory, it is frequently assumed that the
most successful strategy or cultural trait will become the most
frequent. From our knowledge, this is far from obvious be-
cause of this inaccuracy in transmission for cultural traits. In
the Quebec population (Austerlitz and Heyer 1998), large
families tend to have children who will have large families on
their own, but the “large family” phenotype does not invade
the population. Indeed, there is a high probability for a “large
family” to become a “small family” in the next generation,
that is, to “mutate.” The process is then equivalent to a se-
lection/mutation model that reaches equilibrium. If you have
a mutation rate high enough, the large family does not invade.
If some cases it can go as far as erasing any signal, an extreme
case that Lansing and Cox call the Red Queen evolution.
In my view it is quite likely that the cultural transmission
will be much less efficient than genetic transmission, that is,
that a high “mutation rate” will be seen in the evolutionary
trajectory.
My last comment is to broaden again the field of cultural
and biological evolution. I want to emphasize that culture has
an impact on our evolution not only through selective pro-
cesses such as gene-culture coevolution but also through neu-
tral evolution. The most classical examples are the importance
of cultural barriers to mating, as in the cases where language
or religion create a limitation of gene flow. This has an im-
portant role in shaping interpopulation genetic diversity. Fur-
thermore, cultural behaviors can also shape the intrapopu-
lation genetic diversity by reducing effective population size
through social organization (Chaix et al. 2007; Se´gurel et al.
2008). In conclusion, the vast field of interactions between
culture and genetic evolution in our species is a promising
research area, and I agree with Lansing and Cox that it is far
from limited to evolutionary game theory approach.
Eric Alden Smith
Department of Anthropology, University of Washington,
Seattle, Washington 98195-3100, U.S.A. (easmith@
u.washington.edu). 18 VII 10
I found this is a frustrating article. It begins with an abstract
that makes various strong claims, some of which are barely
addressed in the article. The authors raise a variety of pro-
vocative issues—Lewontin’s dismissal of cultural evolution-
ism, the centrality of game theory in evolutionary analysis,
distinguishing selection from neutrality—that are never suf-
ficiently explored nor clearly linked. The paper is less than
the sum of its parts, and some of the parts are quite prob-
lematic. Nevertheless, Lansing and Cox do introduce CA read-
ers to some important debates, though not in the most en-
lightening fashion.
According to the abstract, “the relevance of EGT [evolu-
tionary game theory] depends on whether its assumptions
are met. Those assumptions are quite restrictive: selection is
constant, time horizons are deep, the external environment
is not part of the game, and neutral processes such as drift
are irrelevant.” These are strong claims, and I find them over-
stated at best. Like many theoretical models or abstractions,
EGT can be “relevant” in the sense of explaining a substantial
amount even when its assumptions are not strictly met. Fur-
thermore, most of the assumptions listed are not really central
to EGT; “constant” selection, for one, is explicitly not assumed
in the large and well-studied class of games where payoffs
(selection coefficients) vary according to the population fre-
quency of different strategies (e.g., hawk-dove). Many current
applications of EGT recognize the important role of stochastic
factors such as mutation and drift and often explicitly in-
corporate those into simulations structured around EGT
models. Models of cultural evolution, such as those developed
by Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005), typically incorporate
specific parameters involving neutral or stochastic factors,
such as error (e.g., in copying), sampling (e.g., of cultural
models by naive individuals), and the like. The well-known
result that two or more strategies may have equal payoffs in
specific game environments, and therefore can invade via
drift, plays an important role in many EGT models of the
evolution of cooperation. The abstract’s concluding claim,
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that “exclusive reliance on EGT can obscure the respective
roles of selective and neutral processes,” may well be true,
but I question how many evolutionists who rely on EGT
actually do so “exclusively.”
The article is pervaded with affirmations of null models
(“neutrality”) when what the analyses cited actually demon-
strate is failure to reject a null model. This misrepresentation
of elementary statistical logic is especially troubling because
the authors are aware of it but acknowledge the point only
in a footnote. This seems part of a larger pattern of promoting
skepticism concerning the importance of natural selection and
adaptation in biology and anthropology. Thus, the classic at-
tacks of Gould and Lewontin are repeatedly cited, but the (to
my mind definitive) rebuttals of same are ignored (e.g., Alcock
2001; Maynard Smith 1978; Mayr 1983; Queller 1995); a quo-
tation from Kimura (1983) is deployed to suggest that selec-
tionist explanations routinely rely on facile stories rather than
quantitative evidence; the burgeoning evidence for rapid and
pervasive natural selection on the human genome goes un-
cited; and so on.
Lansing and Cox represent the logic of adaptationist re-
search in sometimes simplistic ways. Consider their analysis
of paternal lineages in Indonesia. Finding that most popu-
lations do not exhibit differential long-term success in any
given Y-chromosome haplotype, they conclude that short-
term correlations between social dominance and fecundity
have no long-term evolutionary effects. But all these results
show is that social dominance in these populations is not
linked to genes on the nonrecombining segment of the Y
chromosome. In any case, any genetic variation for repro-
ductive dominance would quickly be exhausted by selection
(the genes coding for dominance going to fixation). Instead
of selection for dominance per se, a more plausible scenario
(one that actually invokes EGT) involves a heritable condi-
tional strategy: if one happens to have a phenotype that is
endowed (by inheritance or circumstance) with features that
allow one to gain social dominance and thereby relative re-
productive success, seize the opportunity. Such a strategy,
transmitted culturally or genetically, could go to fixation and
be maintained by selection and yet still be consistent with
apparent neutrality of Y-haplotypes. In contrast, the simple
neutrality argument apparently advocated by Lansing and Cox
implies that all the phenomena associated with social and
reproductive dominance (phenomena that are ubiquitous in
vertebrates, including our primate relatives) are just noise—
sound and fury signifying nothing.
On a positive note, the short section on evolutionary feed-
back and niche construction leads in a useful direction. Evo-
lutionary analyses definitely need to investigate these kinds
of processes in order to gain further insight into cultural and
behavioral phenomena. I am not nearly as skeptical as Lansing
and Cox that EGT has nothing to offer in this regard, but it
is perhaps too early to tell.
Jon F. Wilkins and Peter Godfrey-Smith
Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501, U.S.A.
(wilkins@santafe.edu)/Department of Philosophy, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, U.S.A. 14 VII
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Lansing and Cox note that it is easy to look at a phenomenon
or a set of empirical patterns and develop post hoc adaptive
or selective explanations. This fact has been widely discussed
within evolutionary biology, and this discussion is responsible
for the centrality of “tests of neutrality” within the field. Lan-
sing and Cox argue convincingly for an increased role for
formal tests of neutrality in the analysis of cultural data. We
wish to raise a related issue that is less well understood in the
biological evolution community but that we believe underlies
many of its most persistent controversies.
Whether or not a particular analysis provides support for
the action of natural selection depends in no small part on
the grain of analysis and the scope of the alternatives con-
sidered by the modeling framework used. Lansing and Cox,
like many writers in evolutionary biology, treat models based
on adaptation and models based on other population genetic
factors as rivals: in their application to a particular case, they
are treated alternative explanations of the same phenomena.
However, we think that in both the biological and cultural
cases, this is not quite the right way to think of the relation
between adaptationist and population-genetic models. We
suggest, instead, that good adaptive explanations tend to be
at a slightly coarser grain of analysis than population-genetic
models. Different tools consider different timescales of evo-
lution and, implicitly, different sets of alternatives.
A good way to think about this is with the metaphor of
an “adaptive landscape” (see Wilkins and Godfrey-Smith
2009). In this metaphor, we imagine a large set of alternative
types represented in a space, where the “height” in this space
reflects the relative fitness associated with those types. An
adaptive process, if one is present, takes the population from
valleys to peaks. Other processes may produce change in a
way that does not track fitness. Population-genetic tools,
which consider changes in allele frequencies over the course
of generations, focus attention on a narrow region in the space
of all possible genotypes or phenotypes, all closely related to
the type(s) observed in the data. Analyses at this scale tend
to emphasize the importance of mechanistic constraints (such
as recombination) and random sampling (genetic drift). Nat-
ural selection when seen at this scale is one factor among
many, and it has limited predictive importance. Game-the-
oretic tools, by contrast, tend to consider somewhat longer
timescales, and a larger set of alternatives. They are concerned
not with the fine details of movement on the landscape but
with a general and longer-term tendency for the population
to spend its time near peaks rather than valleys. In this sense,
an adaptationist model is more “zoomed out” than a pop-
ulation-genetic one. The analyses invoked by paleontologists
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and in studies of the evolution of development tend to zoom
out even farther, considering observed forms in contrast to
a broad range of hypothetical alternative types. At this coarsest
grain of analysis, selection again recedes in perceived impor-
tance, as the large set of conceivable alternatives highlights
the great importance of historical contingency in producing
observed forms.
We suggest that a similar set of issues is expected to arise
in the context of analyses of cultural evolution. The exact
relations between population-genetic factors and adaptation
seen in biology will not be identical to those in the cultural
context, but a similar set of relationships between subtly dif-
ferent levels of “zoom” may be found. One kind of model
looks at the fine structure of change in a population, with an
important role for the quirks of transmission rules and ran-
dom sampling, while another kind of model might look at
coarser-grained patterns in the process of cultural change, by
which cultures tend to adapt to environmental conditions and
reach game-theoretic equilibria. If selectionist thinking has a
role in explaining cultural change, we suggest it will be at an
“intermediate level of zoom” in a way analogous to the bi-
ological case.
It is common for ideas central to our understanding of
biological evolution to be invoked in the interpretation of
patterns in cultural data. Lansing and Cox have made a com-
pelling argument for approaching the analysis of cultural evo-
lution with objectivity and rigor, to avoid an explosion of
“just-so stories.” We applaud their argument and simply add
that the rigorous application of statistical models should be
coupled to an equally rigorous consideration of the assump-
tions and contrasts that implicitly “frame” the content of
those models.
Reply
Many of the reviewers’ comments are concerned with pop-
ulation genetics. Because Current Anthropology is not a ge-
netics journal, we think it may be helpful to summarize some
background for readers who are not biologists.
Before the 1960s, most genetic variation—ultimately en-
coded by changes in our DNA—was thought to be maintained
by Darwinian selection. However, as knowledge of the human
genome accumulated, it soon became clear that we harbor
too much genetic variation for most of it to be under selection.
This proposition—that the majority of genetic variants are
neither good for us nor bad—came to be known as neutral
theory. It is now recognized that DNA can be divided into
two types: genes, which may be affected by Darwinian selec-
tion, and noncoding regions, which selection cannot see and
therefore cannot affect. However, these noncoding regions are
very useful for studying history. For example, by examining
the accumulated variation in noncoding regions of the Y chro-
mosome, geneticists can infer common ancestry: comparing
two men, the more similar their noncoding sequences, the
closer their patrilineal relatedness.
With this background, we turn to Eric Smith’s remarks.
Smith takes issue with one of our examples, a study of the
evidence for male dominance in 41 Indonesian villages (Lan-
sing et al. 2008). In this analysis, we used neutral genetic
markers to identify groups of patrilineally related men. We
then asked whether, in each village, the frequency distribution
of patrilines (how many patrilines and how many men in
each) could be produced by chance alone. Alternatively, the
distribution of patrilines could have been skewed by demo-
graphic processes, such as an influx of newcomers, or by male
dominance: one or a few dominant patrilines outbreeding
others. We found that in 88% of the villages, the distribution
of patrilines was consistent with neutrality, not only today
but for many generations in the past.
Smith objects that “all these results show is that social
dominance in these populations is not linked to genes on the
nonrecombining segment of the Y chromosome.” If the reader
has followed the discussion so far, it should be clear that this
is a misunderstanding. We did not study genes. Indeed, we
doubt that genes “for” dominance exist. We used neutral ge-
netic markers on the Y chromosome merely to identify shared
patrilineal descent. The cause of variation in the distribution
of these patrilines within villages has nothing to do with
“genes coding for dominance” on the Y chromosome. Instead,
it reflects the past demographic history of each village. Over
the past 10 or 20 generations, did some men achieve repro-
ductive dominance and pass it on to their offspring?
We used the Ewens-Watterson equation to calculate the
neutral distribution of patrilines for each village. This equa-
tion assumes that population size is constant, and that the
likelihood of having children is the same for all individuals
in the population. As Feldman, Heyer, Bentley, and Hahn
comment, while the Ewens equation is quite common in bi-
ology, there are other ways to test for neutrality. Two points
are relevant here. First, the general reader may not appreciate
that for any given parameterization of a demographic model,
there is only one unique neutral frequency distribution. The
Ewens equation is powerful because it makes precise predic-
tions based on simple demographic assumptions: constant
population size and equal probability that any individual will
reproduce. For this reason, versions of this equation are widely
used in both genetics and ecology. However, as Heyer, Hahn,
and Bentley note, frequency distributions that look neutral
can also be produced by balancing selection. This leads to the
second point, appropriately stressed by several reviewers:
while for any given demographic model there is only one
neutral distribution, test results indicating that frequency dis-
tributions (or phylogenies) are consistent with neutrality need
to be followed up by considering alternative explanations.
In our study of patrilines in Indonesian villages, we did
this by using a power analysis to detect departures from neu-
trality under varying demographic conditions (founder ef-
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fects, bottlenecks, migration) and used additional parameters
to characterize the reproductive consequences of male dom-
inance. Our “Red Queen” model explored a scenario resem-
bling balancing selection, in the context of reproductive com-
petition. We simulated populations experiencing varying
levels of male dominance and/or demographic change, sam-
pled them 10,000 times, calculated the Ewens-Watterson
equation for each replicate, and applied Slatkin’s exact test to
observe departures from the expectation under neutrality. Our
power analysis showed that even relatively short-lived epi-
sodes of dominance are detectable for tens of generations. In
general, neutral changes in the composition of populations
are Markov models, which eventually converge on an equi-
librium distribution. If a community is evolving neutrally and
the frequency distribution of individuals has not yet reached
equilibrium, then the current population will retain some
signature from the past. Consequently, cultural selection (or
its absence) will leave a signal in noncoding DNA that can
persist for centuries.
Although we did not suggest that the Ewens-Watterson
equation is the best (or sole) framework for the analysis of
cultural variants, several reviewers apparently took this to be
our argument. We make no such suggestion; it merely hap-
pens that several of the models we discussed are based on the
Ewens-Watterson equation, so we tried to explain how it
works. In ecology, this test is beginning to be supplemented
by other approaches (e.g., Etienne and Olff 2004), and we
expect that new tests for neutrality will continue to appear.
The tree imbalance method described by Heyer offers a dif-
ferent mathematical perspective on neutrality, and it has been
successfully applied to language evolution by other researchers
(Pagel 2009). In our view, the key point is that these tests
differ from analyses deriving from replicator models in that
they shift the analytical focus from the fitness of individuals
to the population-level consequences of both evolutionary
and stochastic processes. Any process that can be modeled
using replicators will leave a signature in the population that
can be tested for neutrality. Further, as our Indonesian ex-
ample shows, population-level analysis using models devel-
oped for the study of neutral processes in biology offer a
surprisingly rich perspective on the past. This population-
based historical perspective is notably absent from replicator
models.
Turning to other issues raised by the reviewers, Feldman
states that the implication that evolutionary games and rep-
licator dynamics are the same, and both “drive an optimi-
zation process,” is incorrect. We are puzzled by this comment.
In his recent textbook, Martin Nowak describes the replicator
as the “cornerstone of evolutionary game dynamics” (2006:
56); similarly, Hofbauer and Sigmund placed the replicator
equation at the center of their 1988 textbook. The replicator
equation descends from Fisher’s selection equation and cer-
tainly drives an optimization process. However, we think that
Feldman nicely captures the key difference between popula-
tion genetics and replicator models (“adaptive dynamics”) by
noting that replicator models assume that local dynamics are
sufficient to account for global dynamics. This is a key premise
that we hold to be false.
This leads us to the simple and elegant perspective offered
by Wilkins and Godfrey-Smith. As they point out, different
analytical tools are relevant to different evolutionary time-
scales. In genetics, mutations in genes produce variation in
genotypes and phenotypes that can be exploited by natural
selection. At fine scales of space and time, these variations
cluster in small regions of the adaptive landscape. As the
timescale increases, more mutations occur and selection has
more material to work with. The “phenotypic gambit” justifies
game-theoretical approaches at these scales: given enough
time, mutations should produce enough variation for selec-
tion to find its way to optimal solutions.
It is worth noting, however, that the sources of genetic
variation are well-understood chemical processes. Since the
1960s, geneticists have worked hard to quantify patterns of
mutation in different parts of the genome and have found
that, in noncoding regions, they are largely predictable. Se-
lection is thus detectable as a departure from neutrality: se-
lected regions of the genome change in different ways com-
pared to neutral regions. These discoveries revolutionized
evolutionary biology. The question is, are there analogous
types of mutation in cultural phenomena? The best candidates
are probably changes in some aspects of language (lexicon,
phonology) and material culture. The regularity of lexical
change enables researchers to infer historical processes from
variation in the branch lengths of language phylogenies be-
cause words vary systematically in their rate of retention
(Gray, Drummond, and Greenhill 2009). Similarly, in the last
10 years, archaeologists have used phylogenetic methods to
infer population history from artifact distributions (Collard
and Shennan 2008). However, as we note, biologists have the
luxury of thinking in terms of vast evolutionary timescales.
Whether cultural phenomena evolve to such optima or are
instead relentlessly dominated by transient dynamics remains
an open question.
Finally, we note that none of our reviewers commented on
our discussion of coevolutionary models. We believe that un-
derstanding such systems, from the global scale (climate
change) to the local (the commons), may be the key anthro-
pological challenge of our time (Kendal, Tehrani, and Odling-
Smee, forthcoming).
—J. Stephen Lansing and Murray P. Cox
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